Second, as discussed in Footnote #24, we do not find that mandatory bargaining laws had a different mobilizing effect for female teachers as compared to male teachers. Specifically, we created an interaction term for female x mandatory bargaining law and included it in a regression predicting political participation among teachers using the same model specification as is employed in Table 1 . As reported in Table SI -2 below, the coefficient for the interaction term is not statistically different from zero. We interpret this as evidence that male and female teachers equally experienced the mobilizing effect of a mandatory collective bargaining law in their state. Third, as discussed in Footnote #26, we find that the mobilizing effects of a mandatory bargaining law are not confined only to teachers who are members of the teachers union. Instead, the effects extend in the same way to teachers who are not union members. Specifically, we used the same model specification employed in Table 1 of the text but restricted the sample to only teachers who did not report being a member of a labor union in the ANES. As Table SI-3 illustrates below, non-union member teachers experience the same increase in political participation after the implementation of a mandatory bargaining law in their state. Fourth, as discussed in Footnote #27, we find the same mobilizing effect of mandatory bargaining laws when we use the entire ANES time-series sample (instead of only teachers) and create an interaction term for teacher x mandatory bargaining law. The results of this estimation are reported below in Table SI -4 and reveal that the coefficient for the interaction term is (as expected) positive and statistically different from zero. Fifth, as discussed in the text of the paper, one concern about our main empirical finding that teachers participated at higher rates after the implementation of a mandatory bargaining law is that these laws may have emerged in the first place because of strong and influential state-level teachers union interest groups. This concern would be especially problematic for our theory that the chief mechanism linking newly adopted mandatory bargaining laws to increased political activity among rank-and-file teachers was the fact that such laws conferred important organizational subsidies to teachers unions that in turn helped them mobilize teachers in politics.
To investigate this concern, we analyzed a survey of state legislators conducted in 1963 by Wayne L. Francis. In every state, legislators (ranging from a low of 9 to a high of 26) were asked, "One hears a lot these days about the activities of interest groups and lobbies. Which would you say are the most powerful organizations of this kind in your state?" and could rank up to six different groups in order of their influence. Using legislator responses to this question, for each state we calculated (1) the average ranking of teacher interest groups or teacher associations, (2) the percent of legislators who mentioned a teacher group at all, and (3) the percent of legislators who ranked a teacher group as most powerful. We then separately used each measure as a predictor of whether a state implemented a mandatory collective bargaining law in the subsequent decade. As displayed below in Table SI -5, in all three probit models the coefficient for perceived teacher interest group power in a state is not statistically different from zero (i.e. none of the measures predict whether a state implements a mandatory collective bargaining law in the near future). In sum, there is no evidence that states with strong and influential teachers union interest groups were more likely to implement a mandatory collective bargaining law. Sixth, as discussed in detail in Footnote #30, a possible alternative explanation for the results reported in Table 1 is that teachers participate at higher rates after a state passes a mandatory collective bargaining law not because of the law per se, but because states that passed a mandatory bargaining law already had higher levels of union membership in other industries that provided a base of union political activists who could mobilize teachers. To investigate this possibility, we use the same model specification employed in Table 1 and add a measure of the percent of workers who are union members in a respondent's state-year (the data are from www.unionstats.com and are available beginning in 1964). As Table SI-5 reports below, when the measure of union membership is included in the regression model, the coefficient for mandatory bargaining law remains positive and statistically different from zero. In contrast, the coefficient for state-year union membership is not statistically different from zero, which indicates that the level of general union membership in a state has no effect on the rates of political participation among teachers. Seventh, it is possible that states that implemented a mandatory bargaining law were also the most politically competitive. If so, then it could be that greater political competitiveness (as opposed to the mandatory bargaining law) was driving the increase in political participation among teachers. To investigate this possibility, we use the same model specification employed in Table 1 and add three different measures of political competition in a respondent's state-year: (1) the closeness of the two-party presidential vote in that year (if a presidential election year) or from two years prior (if a midterm year), (2) a moving four year average of the competitiveness of state legislative elections using the measure devised by Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) , and (3) a moving four year average of the degree of party competition for control of state government using the measure originally devised by Ranney (1965) . As Table SI-7 reports below, when these three additional variables are included in the regression model the coefficient for mandatory bargaining law remains positive and statistically different from zero. We opt to report the model without these three additional indicators in the text because the state legislative election data only go back to 1970, which shortens the timeframe we can examine and reduces our analytic leverage for comparing teacher political participation in states before and after the implementation of a mandatory bargaining law. 
